Recently the BSL team got a request to take a look at what would be the results of teams going to a 2-run save rule. The thought process here is that if teams would win the vast majority of games when entering the ninth when up by three runs, then why not only use closers for games when up by two runs or less.
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(September 28, 2013 – Source: Greg Fiume/Getty Images North America)
The first step in deciphering the value a two run save rule could have on a team is to analyze the impact on actual games being played. I’m going to use percentages from Joe Posnanski throughout this post for save percentage, as those are the most accurate league-wide figures I’ve found to date.
Posnanski found that teams entering the ninth won about 95% of the time. In 1945. He also found that teams entering the ninth won about 95% of the time in 2012, and just about every year in between. Posnanski’s goal was to determine whether or not closers were making an impact on the game, and found some points arguing that they had. He also found some points arguing that they hadn’t.
My goal though, is to think through a better way to use a closer given that it doesn’t seem the position is going away any time soon. To that end, he found that teams entering the ninth up by three runs win about 97.5% of the time. The percentage is a bit higher in lower run scoring environments (like today) but we’ll say 97.5% is a good ballpark to be in for 3-run leads in the ninth. This holds true from 1960 through today, so “closer” or not, teams win those games 97.5% of the time.
When up two runs going into the ninth, teams generally win those games about 93% of the time. Again, lower scoring environments mean that percentage goes up, but 93% is a decent average to use. Again, this holds true from 1960 through today, so the establishment of closers seems to have only a marginal impact.
When the winning team has only a one run lead entering the ninth inning, the results are less rosy. Those teams win only about 85% of the time, a percentage that has increased slightly over the decades. This is likely a result of closers coming in and pitching the ninth for these games. After all, the closer is generally one of the best pitchers in the bullpen for any given team.
Posnanski sums up his thoughts on having closers and set up men and LOOGYs, and whatever else by saying:
But I just find it fascinating that no matter how much everyone tries to fiddle with the last inning of a game — closers, match-ups, specialists, pinch-hitters, whatever else — those overall ninth-inning win percentages just do not move. I would guess that teams with great closers having great years might help a team squeeze an extra win or two in a season. Maybe. But I do wonder if all of the ninth inning tactics are about as useful as rearranging furniture.
This is all very interesting because, based on his analysis, it seems that teams aren’t seeing much of a benefit using closers, as their chance of winning a given game hasn’t moved much since 1960. You could argue that there might be a marginal benefit in using a closer in a one-run game, where the team on top entering the inning is victorious only 85% of the time. To a lesser degree, I’d even buy that a two run lead is somewhat suspect, as 7% of those games end up with the team that’s down winning the ballgame. Once we get to three run games though, that’s where you lose me. 97.5% is 97.5% is 97.5%. Granted, I probably wouldn’t throw my long relief guy in the ninth, but I can’t see any solid bullpen arm drastically lowering those odds.
I would make the argument that the impact of using a closer in those three run games, vs. not using a closer is maringal. Maybe a quarter of a win over a season. In two runs games, we’re talking maybe half a win at most over a full season. When we get down to one run games, the difference might be a full win.
Here’s where the two run save rule comes in handy. If the team’s closer, it’s best reliever, only came in when the team was up by one or two runs entering the ninth, they would have an impact on the games the team is most likely to lose (comparatively). Those games that they enter with a three run lead? They’d probably still win about 97.5% of those.
The impact over the course of a season would be maybe .25 wins lost, that would otherwise be ‘saved’ by a traditional closer. Last season the Orioles entered the ninth inning up by 3 runs, and went on to win the game, 20 times. This is where there is a significant impact.
If teams only used a closer for one or two run saves, then their closer would no longer rack up 50+ saves in a given season. Since saves impact arbitration lowering save totals for closers would help bring costs down throughout that process. It could also, arguably, make lesser relievers more attractive to other teams in trades because they would get to save a few games each season which makes other teams believe they could be a closer for them. The ramifications of this kind of move are huge, and there’s at least a decent chance that the fraction of a win lost on the field would be recouped with lower player salaries and higher player values on the trade market.
It doesn’t seem like the closer is going away any time soon. Something that is approachable though is reducing the number of save opportunities your closer gets. Along with the benefits detailed above, it lets you use them in non-save situations where you need your best reliever. Perhaps this is the next step in moving towards ideal bullpen usage.
Jeff was the owner of the Orioles blog Warehouse Worthy, which focused on making advanced statistics a part of the conversation for the average fan. Outside of baseball, Jeff is a graduate of Loyola University where he received his Bachelor’s and Master’s in Business Administration. The Maryland native currently works for an Advertising Agency in downtown Baltimore. Previously a contributor to Beyond the Boxscore, he joined Baseball Prospectus in September 2014. You can reach him at jeff.long@baltimoresportsandlife.com.